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THE U.S. MARITIME STRATEGY’S NEW THINKING REVIEWING THE
“COOPERATIVE STRATEGY FOR 21ST CENTURY SEAPOWER”

Su Hao

On 17 October 2007, the new maritime strategy, jointly drafted by the U.S. Navy,
Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, was formally introduced at the United States
Naval War College in Rhode Island. The U.S. Department of Defense website
published the full text simultaneously. This important strategic report is titled
“21st Century Sea Power Cooperation Strategy” [A Cooperative Strategy for 21st
Century Seapower]. This is the first time in history that the three joint forces
have formulated a unified maritime strategy. This strategy report represents the
first major revision of U.S. maritime strategy in over twenty years. The 1986
U.S. maritime strategy was developed in the latter part of the Cold War, and was
a strategy of “war at the core,” for the purpose of establishing maritime hegemony for the global fight against the Soviet navy. Obviously, with the breakup
of the Soviet Union and the decline of the Soviet navy, the “1986 Edition” of the
U.S. maritime strategy has become obsolete. U.S. Navy theoretical circles were
faced with the new situation of international antiterrorism and the rapid rise
of emerging countries and the formation of an international multipolar world,
in the face of various kinds of traditional security and nontraditional security
threats after the “9/11” incident, the war in Afghanistan, and the war in Iraq.
After more than two years of debate and discussion, the new maritime strategy
was introduced under the great banner of “cooperation.”
The report contains a total of sixteen pages, divided into five parts: Introduction, Challenges of a New Era, Maritime Strategic Principles, Implementing the
Strategy, and Conclusion. In the introduction, the new strategy puts forward
its central viewpoint: that coordination and cooperation must be strengthened
among the maritime forces of each military service and each domestic department, [as well as among] all international allies. Mutual confidence and trust
must [likewise] be fostered to [further common interests in] answer[ing] common threats. For a prosperous future, sea power must be a unified force. Another important point is that preventing wars and winning wars are equally
important. The new strategy holds that naval forces should be committed to
decisively win the war, but at the same time it is also necessary to enhance
the capacity to prevent war [from occurring]. The report emphasizes that

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2008

1

Naval War College Review, Vol. 61 [2008], No. 4, Art. 8

S U H AO

69

preventing war has been elevated to the same [level of] importance as winning
war. This is a major bright spot of the strategy.
In the section on Challenges of a New Era, the new strategy systematically
analyzes each potential threat facing the United States, including the continuous growth of transnational actors, and the proliferation of weapons technology
and information, [as well as of] natural disasters, etc. The new strategy believes
that the future is full of uncertainties, particularly [with] the vast majority of
the world’s population living in areas within several hundred kilometers of the
ocean, which requires a whole new way of thinking about the role of sea power.
It stressed that no country alone has adequate resources to ensure the security
of the entire maritime area. The strategy therefore calls upon each nation’s government, nongovernmental organizations, international organizations, and the
private sector to develop partnerships [based on] common interests to deal with
the new threats constantly emerging.
In its section on Maritime Strategic Principles, the new strategy puts forward [the following]: In order to fulfill the United States’ commitments to the
security and stability of its allies, U.S. maritime forces will be concentrated and
forward deployed in order to restrict the area of conflict, [and thereby] prevent
large-scale war. In the future, U.S. maritime forces will focus on areas in which
there is tension or in which the United States is required to fulfi ll commitments
to its allies. The United States will continue to deploy powerful combat forces
in the western Pacific, the Arabian Sea, and the Indian Ocean in order to protect the interests of the United States and its allies and contain potential competitors. But in the new environment, the United States is facing a variety of
threats around the world; it should therefore make full use of the expeditionary
and multirole uses of maritime power and globally distribute forces in a taskoriented manner in order to defend the homeland and U.S. citizens and promote U.S. national interests around the world. The report consequently puts
forward six strategic missions at the regional and global level: make use of forward deployment, limit regional conflict with decisive maritime power, prevent
war between great powers, win wars, expand the degree of depth for national
homeland defense, and develop and preserve a cooperative system with even
more allies; it is necessary to prevent and contain the damage and instability in
some areas to prevent endangering the stability of the global system.
The section on the Implementation of the Strategy puts forward six major
missions for maritime power, including forward deployment, deterrence, sea
control, force delivery, maritime security and humanitarian assistance, etc. The
new strategy calls for the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard to jointly
expand their core capabilities of maritime power. In order to increase its operability, the new strategy explicitly requires that three aspects be regarded as the

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol61/iss4/8

2

70

Hao: The U.S. Maritime Strategy’s New Thinking: Reviewing the “Coopera

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R EV I EW

highest priority missions for maritime power at present: enhancing integration
and coordinated combat capability, maritime security awareness, and personnel
preparation.
The conclusion stresses that this strategy is issued based on a comprehensive
assessment of the nation’s security requirements. It does not assume conflict,
but also recognizes the historical reality that peace cannot be automatically
maintained. It requires building a series of core competencies from a broad,
long-range perspective, [and] proactively seizing opportunities to protect the
vital interests of the United States. It recognizes that in this era of rapid changes
[the United States] face[s] uncertain factors that give rise to challenges. It points
out, moreover, the importance in the twenty-first century of U.S. naval forces
working together with other countries to promote global security and prosperity while simultaneously defending the nation’s vital national interests.
报告与美国海军界正在酝酿的所谓 “千舰海军” 的概念有异曲同工之处.
The [maritime strategy] and the so-called “Thousand Ship Navy” concept currently being deliberated within U.S. Navy circles are two sides of the same coin.
Overall, this report has the following characteristics: First, it prominently
emphasizes maritime security cooperation. The report is entitled “[a] cooperative strategy,” and its content places a great deal of emphasis on “cooperation”
at two different levels: domestically, coordination and cooperation among each
maritime force and maritime affairs department; and globally, cooperation
among sea allies and partners. Second, it is the first multiservice maritime strategy report. This is the first time that the U.S. sea services jointly issued a strategic report. The report makes concrete plans for the joint operations of the three
maritime forces. Third, [the report] attaches importance to global maritime security and partnership. The report not only stresses cooperation with allies, but
also advocates forming partnerships with other nations that possess common
interests in maritime affairs. Fourth, new maritime opponents. While attaching
importance to traditional state military opponents, it also attaches tremendous
importance to threats from nonstate actors, and stresses that the latter cause a
series of nontraditional security [threats], [which] will determine [useful areas
for] the maritime security cooperation. Fifth, the strategic means of diversification. In maintaining maritime security means, the report stresses the combination of hard and soft power, and attaches importance to both the forward
deployment of military forces and information gathering capacity building. It
also emphasizes humanitarian assistance to establish a good international image. Sixth, prevent the outbreak of confl icts. Although the report adheres to the
viewpoint of winning wars, what is worth noting is that it places a great deal of
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emphasis on preventing the outbreak of conflict, and specially emphasizes using
powerful force to deter war.
As can be seen from the report, in the face of the complex intertwining of
current traditional threats and nontraditional threats in the international security situation, the United States seems to have felt to some extent that its ability
is not equal to its ambition. It therefore needs to cooperate with its allies and
other partner countries to jointly build a stable maritime security order. The report stressed that this maritime order will be beneficial to protecting the United
States’ own maritime interests, by working together with other countries to pro这 . . . 体现出美国海军方面试图将中国视为海上合作的伙伴, 将中国拉入到美国主导
的海洋安全秩序之中.
[This] reflects the efforts of the U.S. Navy to establish a maritime partnership with China and
integrate China within the maritime security order led by the United States.
mote global security and prosperity. For this reason, the report and the so-called
“Thousand Ship Navy” concept currently being deliberated within U.S. Navy
circles are two sides of the same coin.
On 5–6 December [2007], I attended an academic conference at the U.S.
Naval War College, entitled “Defining a Maritime Security Partnership with
China.” This is the first symposium on Sino-U.S. maritime security cooperation
held by the U.S. Navy. Conference topics included: Sino-U.S. relations and common global maritime interests, maritime awareness, maritime legal issues and
humanitarian operations, regional security challenges, and the future of SinoU.S. maritime security cooperation. The conference revolved around in-depth
discussion of these subjects; proposals for various ways for maritime security
cooperation between the two countries were put forward, and prospects for cooperation were optimistically forecast. In fact, the atmosphere of the conference is consistent with the new strategic report recently published by the United
States, and reflects the efforts of the U.S. Navy to establish a maritime partnership with China and integrate China within the maritime security order led by
the United States.
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